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1. Introduction
A central question in finance is how investors form expectations about future asset returns.
Recent work, including Vissing-Jorgensen (2004), Bacchetta, Mertens, and van Wincoop (2009),
Amromin and Sharpe (2013), Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), and Kuchler and Zafar (2019), pro-
vides convincing evidence of return extrapolation, the notion that investors’ expectations about an
asset’s future return are a positive function of the asset’s recent past returns. Recent models of Bar-
beris et al. (2015) and Jin and Sui (2019) show that return extrapolation helps explain facts about
the aggregate stock market such as excess volatility and predictability of stock market returns.
Despite their intuitive theoretical appeal, extrapolation models have thus far been tested pri-
marily with data on the aggregate stock market. There has been very little direct evidence on how
investors form expectations about individual stock returns, whether these expectations are ratio-
nal, and how they relate to subsequent returns.1 In this paper, we provide some of the first direct
evidence of investor expectations about individual stock returns.2 We find that these expectations
are positively related to recent past returns but are negatively related to subsequent returns, indi-
cating that they are not fully rational. We show that our results are consistent with a theoretical
framework in which investors with extrapolative beliefs interact with more rational investors. The
cross-section dimension of our analysis generates new empirical facts about extrapolative beliefs
and allows us to link such beliefs to cross-sectional asset pricing patterns.
We analyze a novel data set from Forcerank, a crowdsourcing platform for ranking stocks.
In each contest on this platform, participants rank ten stocks based on their perceived future
performance of these stocks over the course of the contest, which is usually one week. Compared to
alternative data sources, Forcerank data have a number of unique advantages for studying investor
beliefs. They contain precise rankings information with a clearly specified forecasting horizon for
a predetermined set of stocks. Moreover, these rankings are solicited from a highly diverse and
geographically distributed group of individuals in a blind setting that rules out herding or cross-
1Cassella and Gulen (2019) analyze the relation between investor expectations about aggregate stock market
returns and the relative pricing of stocks in the cross-section. Bordalo et al. (2019) examine analyst expectations
about earnings growth in the cross-section. However, these studies do not directly analyze cross-sectional data of
return expectations.
2As explained below, our data only allow us to study investor expectations about stock returns over a weekly
horizon.
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learning.3
Taking advantage of the Forcerank data, we investigate how individuals form their expectations
about future returns on individual stocks and how these expectations affect asset prices. We
first estimate, across stocks, a linear regression of investor expectations on past stock returns;
here we use the consensus Forcerank score—each individual stock’s average ranking across all
participants in that contest—as a proxy for the investor expectation of the stock return. We find
that individuals extrapolate from a stock’s recent past returns when forming expectations about
its future return. Specifically, the regression coefficients on recent past returns are all positive and
mostly significant. More important, the coefficients on distant past returns are in general lower
than those on recent past returns: quantitatively, returns four weeks earlier are only about 9% as
important as returns in the most recent week. Not surprisingly, individuals seem to extrapolate
only from the idiosyncratic—rather than the systematic—component of past returns.
Furthermore, this extrapolative pattern remains almost identical after controlling for past fun-
damental news, news sentiment, and risk measures. It is also robust to alternative regression
specifications. As an external validation, we observe a very similar extrapolative pattern when we
use the brokerage account data of Barber and Odean (2000) to examine the relation between initial
buys from a large group of short-term retail traders and past stock returns. In other words, our
findings do not seem to be driven by the specific contest setting of Forcerank.
To parsimoniously capture the extrapolative pattern, we further apply an exponential decay
function as the weighting scheme on past returns.4 In doing so, we summarize the degree of
extrapolation from investor expectations with two parameters. The first parameter, λ1—a scaling
factor that multiplies all past returns—captures a “level” effect (i.e., the overall extent to which
investor expectations respond to past returns). The second parameter, λ2—the weight investors put
3Some social media platforms (e.g., StockTwits and Seeking Alpha) collect a textual form of user opinions about
stock performance, but sometimes textual information cannot be easily converted to precise quantitative information.
Equity analysts’ target prices have also been used to compute return expectations. However, these return expectations
can be affected by herding and “selection bias” that arise from analysts’ career concerns and investment banking
relations (Brav and Lehavy, 2003). (Notwithstanding these issues with target prices, we show suggestive evidence for
extrapolative beliefs even among equity analysts, after removing the illiquid penny stocks; results are available upon
request.) Finally, individual investors’ trading decisions are sometimes used as a measure for investor beliefs (Barber,
Odean, and Zhu, 2009), though they can be driven by other factors, such as liquidity shocks and preferences (Odean,
1998; Barberis and Xiong, 2012; Ingersoll and Jin, 2013). Moreover, short-sale constraints can prevent an investor
from expressing negative return expectations through trading, and the investor’ choice set is limited to stocks that
recently caught her attention (Barber and Odean, 2008).
4Early work by Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), Barberis et al. (2015), and Cassella and Gulen (2018) has used
this specification to study investors’ return expectations about the aggregate stock market.
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on distant past returns relative to recent past returns when forming beliefs about future returns—
captures a “slope” effect. Investors’ degree of extrapolation is jointly determined by λ1 and λ2:
when λ2 is much lower than one, investor expectations are determined primarily by most recent
past returns; at the same time, investor expectations exhibit a high degree of extrapolation only
when λ1 is high. We find that λ1 estimated from the Forcerank expectations data is significantly
positive and λ2 estimated from the Forcerank expectations data is significantly lower than one.
Together, these results confirm that Forcerank participants have a strong degree of extrapolation.
Our cross-sectional data allow us to study the determinants of investors’ extrapolative expec-
tation as captured by λ1 and λ2. We find that extrapolation is asymmetric between positive and
negative past returns: investors put more weight (a larger λ1) on negative past returns, and this
weight decays more slowly into the past (a higher λ2) for negative returns. Similarly, we find both
λ1 and λ2 to be higher for past stock returns during weeks when the market as a whole is doing
poorly. Moreover, an individual stock’s return relative to its peer performance also seems to affect
investor beliefs. Specifically, we find λ2 to be higher for contest-weeks with more dispersed returns.
All these results so far can be attributed to salience. Negative news—both on individual stocks
and on the overall market—and past stock returns that are significantly different from peers’ returns
can be rather salient to investors. Indeed, using news coverage as a direct measure of salience, we
find investor expectations to respond more strongly to salient past returns (a larger λ1), and salient
returns from both the recent past and the distant past affect investor expectations (a higher λ2).
We further examine how investor and firm characteristics affect expectation formation. We show
that, compared to nonprofessionals, financial professionals display a lower degree of extrapolation.
Specifically, the λ1 estimate for professionals is significantly lower than that for nonprofessionals,
suggesting that professionals rely less on past stock returns when forming expectations about returns
over the next week. Moreover, the λ2 estimate for professionals is significantly higher than that
for nonprofessionals, suggesting that professionals’ expectations rely on past returns over a longer
history. At the firm level, we find that λ1 is positively related to firm size but is negatively related to
the firm’s average volatility of weekly returns. We also find that λ2 is positively related to firm size
and turnover but is negatively related to the firm’s book-to-market ratio. For the effects of these
firm characteristics on investor expectations, we offer some potential explanations that are related
to salience and visibility. Overall, our cross-sectional analysis provides new empirical regularities
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that can inform future theoretical work on investor beliefs.
Given our observations on how Forcerank participants form expectations about future stock
returns, a natural follow-up question is whether these expectations are accurate or systematically
biased. We find that a higher Forcerank score significantly predicts a lower return over the next
week in Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. We then decompose the Forcerank score into
two components: 1) a predicted score—a weighted average of the stock’s past 12-week returns
with the weights constructed using the λ1 and λ2 estimates of Forcerank participants—and 2)
the residual. We find that both components significantly predict future returns with a negative
sign, indicating that the beliefs of Forcerank participants are systematically biased. Furthermore,
these return predictability results survive the controls of past returns—raw returns, return ranks,
and dummies capturing extreme returns—over the past one week, one month, and one quarter.
Therefore, our results are not simply rediscovering the well-documented short-term return reversal
phenomenon.
To clarify, we do not claim that Forcerank users alone move stock prices, nor that they repre-
sent all the market participants. Instead, we interpret our evidence as suggesting that the beliefs of
these Forcerank users represent the thinking process of a broader group of behavioral investors in
the market. To better understand the impact of extrapolative beliefs on asset prices, we present a
cross-sectional model of return extrapolation. The model features two types of agent, extrapolators
and fundamental traders. Consistent with the beliefs of Forcerank users, extrapolators form expec-
tations about the future returns of individual stocks by extrapolating from the recent past returns
of these stocks, and they trade stocks according to these extrapolative beliefs. Fundamental traders,
on the other hand, serve as arbitrageurs who correct for mispricing. However, these traders are
risk averse and hence cannot completely undo the mispricing caused by extrapolators. As a result,
extrapolator beliefs negatively predict future stock returns, just as we have shown empirically.
Importantly, the stylized model described above makes predictions regarding the heterogeneity
of return predictability in the cross-section. Specifically, return predictability should be stronger
among stocks whose clienteles are dominated by behavioral extrapolators, and among stocks with
a higher degree of extrapolation—this is measured by λi,1(1− λi,2) for stock i in the model. Both
predictions are strongly borne out in our sample.
Finally, we evaluate the economic significance and generalizability of our return predictability
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results. A trading strategy that buys stocks with low Forcerank scores and sells stocks with high
Forcerank scores generates a significant profit of seven basis points (bps) per day (or, equivalently,
about 18% per year) in our sample, after controlling for the Fama-French five factors, the momentum
factor, and the short-term reversal factor. The returns accrue gradually over time after portfolio
formation, so they go beyond bid-ask bounce and other market microstructure effects. As an
external validation of our findings, we extend our analysis to stocks that are not covered by the
Forcerank platform over a longer sample period. To do this, we compute predicted Forcerank scores
for non-Forcerank stocks as the weighted average of their past 12-week returns where the weights
are calibrated to the beliefs of Forcerank participants.
We find that these predicted scores negatively forecast next week’s returns in the full sample
of non-Forcerank stocks. The associated trading strategy delivers a highly significant risk-adjusted
return, outperforming the standard short-term return reversal strategies that sort on either past
one-week or past one-month returns. Among the largest non-Forcerank stocks, the trading strat-
egy based on predicted scores continues to generate a significant risk-adjusted return. Moreover,
predicted scores still outperform simple past returns even among this subset of stocks that are least
affected by illiquidity.
Our paper adds to a literature that uses survey data to study investor beliefs (Piazzesi and
Schneider, 2009; Amromin and Sharpe, 2013; Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014; Koijen, Schmeling,
and Vrugt, 2015; Kuchler and Zafar, 2019; Giglio et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020). More broadly,
our paper adds to a recent literature that analyzes the role of investor beliefs in explaining asset
prices in aggregate markets and in the cross-section (Hirshleifer, Li, and Yu, 2015; Barberis et al.,
2015, 2018; Cassella and Gulen, 2018, 2019; Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2018; Gennaioli and
Shleifer, 2018; Bordalo et al., 2019; Jin and Sui, 2019; Nagel and Xu, 2019; Greenwood, Hanson,
and Jin, 2019).5
Furthermore, our empirical findings provide direct support for return extrapolation, as they
differ from the predictions of alternative theories that are based on fundamental extrapolation
(Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998).6 Finally, our
paper contributes to the voluminous literature on the short-term return reversal starting from Fama
5See Barberis (2018) for a review.
6We discuss this point further in Section 3.
5
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144849
(1965), Jegadeesh (1990), and Lehmann (1990). Our finding of significant return predictability
on the largest and most liquid stocks suggests that extrapolative beliefs, in addition to liquidity
shocks, can also be an important contributor to short-term return reversals. While the Forcerank
expectation data are weekly forecasts and hence map nicely to the horizon over which short-term
return reversals operate, they do not speak directly to return anomalies over longer horizons—
e.g., the medium-term momentum and long-term reversals—in the absence of additional modeling
assumptions. Nevertheless, as discussed in the Appendix, some field and lab evidence suggests that
the insights we obtain from our weekly data regarding investor beliefs can still be generalizable to
forecasts over longer horizons.
In what follows, Section 2 provides a detailed description of the Forcerank platform and our data
set. Section 3 presents our empirical analysis of the formation of investor expectations. Section 4
shows the predictive power of Forcerank scores for future stock returns as well as the performance
of trading strategies. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains a stylized asset pricing model of
extrapolative beliefs and some additional discussions.
2. Data and summary statistics
In this section, we describe the data from Forcerank. Forcerank is a crowdsourcing platform
that organizes weekly competitions in which participants enter thematic games, and in each game,
rank a list of ten stocks according to their perceived performance (percentage gain) of these stocks
over the next week.
There are two main types of game. Most games focus on a particular industry group. For
example, in one game, contestants are asked to rank ten stocks from the same e-commerce industry
based on their expectations of these stocks’ returns over the next week. Occasionally, the industry
group is further partitioned by the market capitalizations of the stocks. For example, one game
can contain only large stocks from the biotech industry. The other type of game is based on special
themes, such as exchange-traded funds (ETFs) or the most heavily shorted stocks. We focus on
individual firms in our study and therefore exclude games that involve ETFs. Table 1 lists the
types of game in our final sample, which covers a period from February 2016 to December 2017.
[Place Table 1 about here]
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In addition, most games are repeatedly conducted over time on the platform, resulting in
multiple weekly contests for a given game. The goal of the participants is to precisely forecast
rankings of future stock returns: they want to match their perceived rankings of the stocks with
the actual rankings of these stocks based on their realized returns over the next week. Fig. 1
illustrates an example of one such contest.
[Place Fig. 1 about here]
Upon completion of each contest, Forcerank assigns points to participants based on the accu-
racy of their own rankings exclusively; it does not benchmark against the performance of other
participants. For most of our sample period, points do not result in monetary compensation due
to the legal risks involved.7 Instead, Forcerank maintains weekly leader boards where participants
are ranked based on the cumulative points they have earned from the past 13 weeks. Rank-
ing participants based on cumulative points helps alleviate strategic behavior that can arise in a
“winners-take-all” tournament, since it is difficult to be both strategic and consistently accurate.
Furthermore, strategic behavior is difficult on this platform for two other reasons. First, during
each contest, participants do not observe the current consensus rankings or individual rankings made
by other participants. Second, the default initial rankings are randomized for every participant, so
there is no common default rankings across participants to benchmark against. It is therefore our
view that users who choose to participate on Forcerank are likely to truthfully reveal their return
expectations across stocks in the game.
Our sample contains mostly industry contests (1,318 out of a total of 1,396 contests). Popular
industries covered in our sample include enterprise software (136 weekly contests), biotech (115
weekly contests), social media (111 weekly contests), e-commerce (108 weekly contests), and apparel
(101 weekly contests). Stocks covered in these contests tend to be household names that attract
attention from individual investors. Over time, Forcerank expanded its game coverage to also
include industries such as fast food, investment banking, airlines, and semiconductors. The only
7Monetary compensation could turn the Forcerank game into an illegal security-based swap in the eyes of the
SEC (see http://dodd-frank.com/sec-says-mobile-phone-game-is-an-illegal-security-based-swap). Forcerank canceled
its cash payments to participants in June 2016. Given this, we split our sample into two parts, one before June
2016 and one after. We find that the degree of extrapolation from participant expectations is strong for both parts
of the sample. The lack of monetary compensation, however, can explain the slow growth in user participation as
well as Forcerank’s decision to temporarily shut down the platform since April 2018 to focus its limited resource on
developing another crowdsourcing platform called Estimize.
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non-industry game we study involves the heavily shorted stocks (78 weekly contests that span a
period from March 2016 to December 2017).
Our final sample contains 293 unique stock tickers, and it contains 12,798 contributions sub-
mitted by 1,045 distinct users. Table 2 presents a breakdown of stocks and users.
[Place Table 2 about here]
Stocks in our sample tend to be large stocks. The average stock has a market capitalization
of $56.6 billion (the median is $15.4 billion). Using the NYSE size cutoffs, the average stock in
our sample has a size quintile rank of 4.20. This fact is important for interpreting our subsequent
return predictability results: given their sizes, stocks in our sample are less likely to be subject to
the short-term return reversal induced by liquidity shocks. Our sample also tilts toward growth
stocks: the average stock has a book-to-market ratio B/M of 0.37 (the median is 0.26), and the
average B/M quintile rank is 2.20.
The user participation in our sample is highly skewed. While about half of the users each
played only three contests, the most active 1% played 355 contests covering 31 different games. In
a subsequent analysis, we focus on some of these regular participants and examine whether their
expectation formation process changes over time.
We observe the self-reported professional background among a fraction of users who registered
before March 2017. Specifically, among the 606 users who registered before March 2017, 244 of
them chose to report their professional background. Panel B of Table 2 breaks down these 244 users.
Among them, 72 are financial professionals. We conjecture that, compared to nonprofessionals, the
degree of extrapolation is less pronounced among financial professionals. In our empirical analysis,
we confirm this conjecture.
3. Expectation formation
In this section, we study the formation of investor expectations using the Forcerank data.
First, we study the relation between the average beliefs of Forcerank users and past variables such
as past stock returns. We then examine heterogeneity in beliefs by looking at how user and firm
characteristics affect expectation formation.
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To start, we analyze how past stock returns affect Forcerank users’ average expectation of future
stock returns. In each week t, individuals are asked to submit rankings of ten stocks according to
their perceived performance of these stocks over week t + 1. For each stock in each contest, we
measure investors’ average expectation using the consensus Forcerank score, which is the average
ranking across all individuals in that contest. For each individual, the stock she ranked the highest
receives a score of ten, and the stock she ranked the second highest receives a score of nine. Similarly,
the stock she ranked the lowest receives a score of one, and the stock she ranked the second lowest
receives a score of two.
3.1. Linear model
We start with a simple linear regression model using the consensus Forcerank score as the
dependent variable and past stock returns as the explanatory variables:
Forceranki,t = γ0 +
∑n
s=0
βs ·Ri,t−s + εi,t, (1)
where Forceranki,t is the end-of-week-t consensus ranking based on investors’ average expectation
about the performance of stock i over week t+ 1; Ri,t−s represents the lagged return (or the lagged
contest-adjusted return we define below) of stock i over week t− s, and s goes from 0 to 11.
[Place Table 3 about here]
The results are reported in Table 3. Column (1) uses the raw level of past returns. The results
show clear evidence that past returns drive Forcerank scores. The coefficients on the past 12
weekly returns are all positive and mostly significant. More important, the coefficients on recent
past returns are in general higher than those on distant past returns.8
Given that individuals submit relative rankings on Forcerank, it is possible that the relative
levels of past returns within a contest are more relevant to expectation formation. In Column (2)
and onwards, we adjust past returns by demeaning these return levels within each contest: we
8This regression result is supported by survey evidence from 20 Caltech undergraduate students who participated
in ranking stocks on Forcerank from February 2018 to March 2018. When asked about how they came up with
their stock rankings, the students typically responded by saying that the rankings are based on “the last week and
last month’s performance,” “a quick look of past month returns,” or “the last week’s ranks.” The survey evidence,
while limited in its scope, does suggest that individuals extrapolate from past returns directly rather than from other
variables that are simply correlated with past returns.
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compute contest-adjusted returns by subtracting from raw returns the average return of the ten
stocks in the contest. The extrapolative pattern in Column (2) remains similar to that in Column
(1). At the same time, compared to Column (1), the coefficients on contest-adjusted past returns
and the R-squared all increase, indicating a better fit to the data. We further decompose past
weekly returns into their systematic and idiosyncratic components using the CAPM. Columns (3)
and (4) show that investors extrapolate only from past idiosyncratic returns. This result is intuitive:
Forcerank contests contain similar stocks from the same industry, and as a result, within-contest
return variations are likely to be idiosyncratic in nature.
The positive relation between the current return expectation and recent past returns is robust
to different estimation methods and sample periods. In Column (5), we estimate an ordered logit
model that accounts for the ranking nature of our dependent variable. In Column (6), we convert
the explanatory variables from past weekly returns to the stocks’ actual past rankings. Across
these alternative regression specifications, the pattern of return extrapolation remains similar. The
coefficients on the past 12 weekly returns (or the rankings of these past returns) are all positive
and mostly significant. Moreover, the coefficients on recent past returns remain significantly higher
than those on distant past returns.
Columns (7) and (8) repeat the analysis in Column (2) separately for the first half (before March
1, 2017) and the second half (after March 1, 2017) of our sample period. While we observe return
extrapolation in both subperiods, the pattern seems to be stronger in the second half. A potential
reason is that, with increased user participation on Forcerank, the consensus ranking became less
noisy over time.
Finally, Column (9) includes some other potential determinants of investors’ return expecta-
tions. These additional controls include tones of news coverage, the stock’s CAPM expected returns
from the previous 12 weeks, and past fundamental news measured by monthly revisions in consensus
earnings forecasts (or, during the earnings announcement months, by the actual earnings surprises)
from the previous 12 months. These additional controls do not alter the basic pattern of return
extrapolation: the general decay pattern among coefficients for past returns remains strong and
quantitatively similar with and without controls.9 However, when we add controls, the additional
9While not reported in Column (9) due to space constraints, the coefficients on past fundamental news are positive
and sometimes significant, suggesting that individuals’ return expectations are in part affected by past fundamentals.
Nevertheless, in contrast to those on past returns, the coefficients on past fundamental news do not seem to decay
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data requirement reduces our sample size by more than 15%. For this reason, we do not include
these additional controls in most of our remaining analysis.
It is important to note that the results reported in Table 3 provide direct support for return
extrapolation, as they do not arise from alternative models of biased beliefs such as Barberis,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998). In these models,
agents’ expectation of future cash flows becomes overly optimistic after a sequence of positive cash
flow shocks—and hence positive returns—from the recent past. However, the agents’ expectation
of future returns stays constant and hence does not vary with past returns. In contrast with this
prediction, Table 3 shows that investors’ expectations of future returns are not constant: they are
a positive function of recent past returns. As such, our results help to distinguish predictions from
different theories.
3.2. External validation
An immediate concern is that our findings so far are driven by features unique to Forcerank: the
game specification, the interface, and the characteristics and incentives of users who are self-selected
to participate, among others. As an external validation, we now examine the trading behavior of a
large group of retail investors. Here we focus on the initial buys of these retail investors. Compared
to other types of trade—e.g., additional buys of the same stock or sales, which could be driven by
factors other than investor beliefs such as investor preferences or liquidity needs—initial buys are
more likely to reflect investors’ return expectations.
We measure initial buys using individual-level transaction records from a large discount broker-
age firm over the period from January 1991 to December 1996 (as in Barber and Odean, 2000). We
remove investors who have less than ten round-trip trades from the sample. Moreover, to match
Forcerank’s one-week forecasting horizon, we focus on frequent traders whose median time of a
round-trip trade is less than ten days. These frequent traders account for 26.5% of all the investors
who have more than ten round-trip trades.
[Place Fig. 2 about here]
We run a linear regression of initial buys on past 12 weekly returns; this is similar to the
into the past.
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regression in Eq. (1). The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one for week t if, during
that week, there is at least one retail investor who purchased the stock for the first time in the
sample. Fig. 2 plots the coefficient estimates on past 12 weekly returns using initial buys as the
dependent variable (right y-axis) against those from the Forcerank sample using the consensus
Forcerank score as the dependent variable (left y-axis). The solid line and the solid-circle line
correspond to the coefficient estimates. The dashed lines and the dash-dot lines correspond to the
95% confidence interval. We find that the extrapolative patterns are very similar across these two
settings: the changes in the two sets of coefficients are almost proportional to each other.10
3.3. Exponential decay model
The linear regression in Eq. (1) allows for independent weights on different past returns. From
this simple specification, we have observed a clear and robust decay pattern in the relation between
investors’ current return expectation and recent past returns. To capture this pattern parsimo-
niously, we now estimate a parametric regression model that assumes an exponential decay of
weights on past returns:
Forceranki,t = λ0 + λ1 ·
∑n
s=0
wsRi,t−s + εi,t, where ws =
λs2∑n
j=0 λ
j
2
. (2)
This exponential decay specification has been previously estimated by Greenwood and Shleifer
(2014), Barberis et al. (2015), and Cassella and Gulen (2018), using aggregate stock market data.
It allows us to characterize extrapolative expectations by two parameters. The first parameter,
λ1—a scaling factor that multiplies all past returns of stock i—captures a “level” effect (i.e., the
overall extent to which investor expectations respond to these past returns). The second parameter,
λ2—which governs how past returns are relatively weighted in forming expectations—captures a
“slope” effect: a λ2 closer to zero means that investors put much higher weight on recent past
10The Forcerank data only measure return expectations over one week, a short forecasting horizon. As a result, a
concern is that our data are not helpful for understanding investor beliefs over longer horizons (such as six months or
one year). One observation can be useful for addressing this concern: investors tend to look at returns over the past
few weeks when forecasting the next week’s return, and they tend to look at returns over the past few years when
forecasting the next year’s return. That is, when forecasting the future return over a time horizon of t—for instance,
t can be a week, a quarter, or a year—investors tend to look at the past returns over a time horizon of N · t, where the
parameter N tends to be stable and independent of the forecasting horizon t, capturing a fundamental psychological
factor such as the degree of recency bias or the speed of memory decay. Such stability is called “time-scale invariance,”
an important finding from the psychology literature. We provide additional discussion about time-scale invariance in
Appendix B.
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returns as opposed to distant past returns. When an investor puts more weight on all past returns
of stock i and, furthermore, assigns more weight to more recent returns on a relative basis, her
beliefs become more extrapolative. That is, a higher λ1 and a lower λ2 jointly lead to a higher
degree of extrapolation; indeed, the extrapolation model in Appendix A shows that the appropriate
measure for the degree of extrapolation is λ1(1−λ2). We first estimate the two parameters, λ1 and
λ2, by assuming them to be constant in the full sample across all stocks and individuals. Later in
this section, we study the heterogeneity of these parameters.
[Place Fig. 3 and Table 4 about here]
Eq. (2) suggests that the estimates of λ1 and λ2 depend on n + 1, the total number of lagged
weekly returns included in this parametric regression. Fig. 3 shows that the estimates of λ1 and
λ2 both become stable when we include 12 or more of the past weekly returns in the estimation
(n ≥ 11). Thus, we use n = 11 for the rest of our analysis.
Table 4 confirms the presence of return extrapolation using the nonlinear regression in Eq. (2).
Specifically, Column (1) uses the raw level of past returns. Columns (2) and onwards focus on
contest-adjusted returns. Column (2) reports an estimate of 34.12 for λ1 and an estimate of
0.55 for λ2. These joint estimates suggest that Forcerank participants exhibit a strong degree of
extrapolation. Column (3) finds similar patterns using the idiosyncratic component of past returns.
To check the robustness of these estimates, Column (4) replaces stocks’ past returns by their actual
past rankings. Columns (5) and (6) further break up the regression results for the first half (before
March 1, 2017) and the second half (after March 1, 2017) of our sample period. Finally, Column
(7) includes controls of past fundamental news, tones of news coverage, and the CAPM expected
returns. Across all columns, we find λ1 to be significantly positive and λ2 to be positive and
significantly smaller than one.11 For the rest of the paper, we focus primarily on the nonlinear
specification in Eq. (2) when analyzing investor expectations, as it succinctly summarizes return
extrapolation using two parameters.
11Moreover, if we replace weekly past returns on the right-hand side of Eq. (2) by daily past returns, we can
estimate λ1 and λ2 using these daily returns. We find that the daily estimations of λ1 and λ2 are consistent with the
weekly estimations. That is, the estimate of λ1 using daily past returns is about five times as big as the estimate of
λ1 using weekly past returns. The estimate of λ2 using daily past returns is about the one-fifth power of the estimate
of λ2 using weekly past returns.
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3.4. Past return characteristics
To develop a deeper understanding of expectation formation, we generalize the regression in
Eq. (2) by separately estimating λ1 and λ2 for past returns of different characteristics. Recent
empirical, experimental, and neuroscience studies suggest that expectation formation differs de-
pending on whether past outcomes are positive or negative. In particular, negative past outcomes
can have a particularly strong influence on investors’ beliefs about future outcomes (see Kuhnen,
2015 for a review of this evidence). To test this hypothesis in our setting, we separate past weekly
returns into positive returns and negative returns and then run a generalized nonlinear regression
of the form:
Forceranki,t = λ0 + λ1,p ·
∑n
s=0
1{Ri,t−s≥0} · ws,pRi,t−s
+λ1,n ·
∑n
s=0
1{Ri,t−s<0} · ws,nRi,t−s + εi,t, (3)
where ws,p =
λs2,p∑n
j=0 λ
j
2,p
and ws,n =
λs2,n∑n
j=0 λ
j
2,n
. In other words, this regression allows λ1 and λ2 to
differ across positive (p) versus negative (n) returns of individual stocks.
[Place Table 5 about here]
Column (1) of Table 5 reports the empirical estimates of λ1,p, λ2,p, λ1,n, and λ2,n. The results
show that return extrapolation is asymmetric. In particular, individuals seem to put more weight
on negative past returns—λ1,n is much larger than λ1,p—and this weight decays more slowly into
the past for negative past returns—λ2,n is much higher than λ2,p and is therefore much closer to
one. While coefficients on positive contest-adjusted past returns become insignificant beyond past
one week, the coefficients on negative contest-adjusted past returns stay strongly significant for
many past weeks: returns four weeks earlier are 45% as important as returns in the most recent
week in determining the current expectation about future returns.
Column (2) allows λ1 and λ2 to differ across up (u) versus down (d) markets, where up (down)
markets are defined as weeks when the market returns are above (below) the median weekly market
return in our sample period (0.23%). We again find both λ1 and λ2 to be higher for past returns
during down markets. Related to this finding, Cassella and Gulen (2018) show that λ2 estimated
from return expectations about the aggregate stock market is significantly higher in bear markets
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than in bull markets. Our result complements theirs by showing that 1) a similar pattern of
asymmetry in λ2 holds in the cross-section, and 2) the asymmetry in the degree of extrapolation
also shows up in the difference between λ1,u and λ1,d. Put differently, negative—rather than
positive—information at both the individual stock level and the market level is more important in
driving expectations about future stock returns (a higher λ1), and it has a more persistent impact
on these expectations (a higher λ2).
12
The regression in Column (3) allows λ1 and λ2 to differ across contest-weeks with dispersed
(disp) versus close (close) returns. Contest-weeks with dispersed (close) returns are those for
which the cross-sectional standard deviation of the ten stocks’ returns is above (below) the median
(2.77%). It is not surprising that dispersed contest-weeks are associated with a lower λ1. The higher
standard deviation of the independent variable (the past return) mechanically results in a lower
regression coefficient for those contest-weeks. What is more interesting is that these dispersed
contest-weeks are also associated with a higher λ2, suggesting that past returns from dispersed
contest-weeks have a more persistent impact on investor expectations.
All the results in Columns (1) to (3) can be explained by salience. Negative returns or returns
during down markets are more salient than positive returns or returns during up markets, and
contests with dispersed stock performance are more salient than those with similar performance,
therefore affecting investor expectations to a larger extent. Consistent with this explanation, Garcia
(2018) and Niessner and So (2018) show that financial press is more likely to cover negative stock
market returns and individual stocks with deteriorating performance. Moreover, Reyes (2019)
finds that investors pay more attention to negative stock market returns than comparable positive
returns.
To directly test the impact of salience on expectation formation, the regression in Column (4) of
Table 5 allows λ1 and λ2 to differ across salient (s) versus nonsalient (ns) past returns. To measure
the salience level associated with the return of stock i in week t, we count the number of news articles
written on the stock in that week. We obtain the news coverage data from RavenPack. To ensure
12Neuroscience studies suggest that extrapolation of positive returns and extrapolation of negative returns take
place in different parts of the human brain. Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) find that, when investors are faced with good
investment outcomes, the nucleus accumbens of the ventral striatum, a particular region of the brain, is activated,
leading to optimistic beliefs about future investment outcomes. On the other hand, when investors are faced with
bad investment outcomes, anterior insula, a different region of the brain, is activated, leading to pessimistic beliefs
about future investment outcomes. Understanding the differences in the process of activating these two regions of
the brain can provide a microfoundation for the asymmetry in return extrapolation we documented.
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that extreme returns are not driving the variation in λ1 and λ2 mechanically, we orthogonalize news
coverage with respect to the absolute returns. Specifically, for each week in the sample period, we
run a cross-sectional regression of the total amount of news coverage of a stock on its absolute
return over the same week. We then define a stock return as salient (nonsalient) if the residual
from this cross-sectional regression is above (below) median.
Column (4) reports the empirical estimates of λ1,s, λ2,s, λ1,ns, and λ2,ns. We find that investor
expectations respond more strongly to salient returns—λ1,s is much larger than λ1,ns—and salient
returns have a more persistent impact on the current expectation than nonsalient returns—λ2,s is
significantly higher than λ2,ns. Our result is also consistent with an attention story: news coverage
draws investor attention to the stock return, making it more salient and hence better encoded into
investor expectations.
3.5. User and stock characteristics
So far we have been studying the heterogeneity of λ1 and λ2 for past returns of different char-
acteristics. Our cross-sectional setting allows us to study heterogeneity in expectation formation
along other dimensions: we can link return expectations to different user and stock characteristics.
Panel A of Table 6 estimates λ1 and λ2 separately for financial professionals and nonprofessionals.
[Place Table 6 about here]
Interestingly, between professional and nonprofessional users, the extrapolation parameters are
quite different. We find that financial professionals have a λ1 of 26.35, which is lower than that of the
nonprofessionals (33.77), suggesting that professionals rely less on past stock returns when forming
expectations about stock returns over the next week. Moreover, professionals have a λ2 of 0.773,
which is higher than that of the nonprofessionals (0.552). This result suggests that nonprofessionals
display a stronger degree of extrapolation, as they overweight recent past returns more strongly.
The weight that nonprofessionals put on returns decays by about 90% one month into the past; in
comparison, the weight applied by professionals takes more than two months to decay by 90%.
Next, we examine how the extrapolation parameters vary across different stocks. First, we
estimate the belief parameters, λi,1 and λi,2, for each stock i. We then regress λi,1 and λi,2 on
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firm characteristics: size, book-to-market ratio, return volatility, and turnover. Panel B of Table 6
presents these results.
We find that the market capitalization of a firm is positively related to both λi,1 and λi,2. One
possible explanation of this finding is that data from larger firms are more visible or accessible to
investors (Begenau, Farboodi, and Veldkamp, 2018). As a result, salience implies that information
about larger firms plays a bigger role in the formation of investor expectations. We also find that
a firm’s turnover—a measure that is positively related to the firm’s size—positively affects λi,2.
In addition, a firm’s return volatility averaged across all weeks in our sample period is negatively
related to λi,1: higher volatility of a stock’s past returns makes it more difficult for investors to
identify a trend in the stock price, or it reduces investors’ confidence in perceiving a trend, therefore
reducing their degree of extrapolation. Finally, λi,2 is higher for growth stocks than for value stocks.
How does an investor’s degree of extrapolation change over time? To address this question,
we take a closer look at the 35 most active users who regularly participated in the contests. For
these users, we can reliably estimate λ1 and λ2 at the individual level and examine the time-
series evolution of these extrapolation parameters. We find that almost all of these active users
are extrapolators; only one is a “contrarian” with a significantly negative λ1. We also find that,
among these users, extrapolative beliefs do not seem to diminish with time. In fact, both λ1 and λ2
generally increased over time, possibly because weekly returns became more salient as users started
to follow these stocks regularly on Forcerank.
To summarize this section, we analyze the Forcerank data and find strong evidence that individ-
uals extrapolate from recent past returns when forming expectations about future stock returns,
especially when recent returns are negative, more dispersed within a contest, or salient. Such
extrapolative beliefs are stronger among nonprofessionals and stocks with certain characteristics.
Overall, our findings suggest that salience is an important source for return extrapolation. As an
external validation, we show a quantitatively similar pattern of return extrapolation among retail
investors who trade frequently, suggesting that our findings are not particularly driven by features
unique to the crowdsourcing platform. With our observations on expectation formation in hand, a
natural follow-up question to examine is whether the return expectations from Forcerank users are
accurate or systematically biased. We address this question in the next section.
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4. Return predictability
In this section, we study the asset pricing implications of investor expectations. First, we exam-
ine the accuracy or plausibility of the return expectations from Forcerank users. We show that the
consensus Forcerank score significantly predicts future stock returns with a negative sign. More-
over, we decompose the Forcerank score into two components: a predicted component explained
by past returns and the residual component that is orthogonal to past returns. We find that both
components negatively predict future stock returns. These return predictability results suggest
that the beliefs of Forcerank users are systematically biased.
Next, we make the assumption that the weekly forecasts from Forcerank users represent the
thinking process of a broader group of behavioral investors in the market. This assumption allows
us to study the asset pricing implications of biased beliefs, and it is consistent with the finding
(presented in Fig. 2) that the extrapolative patterns of return expectations from Forcerank users
and a large group of short-term retail traders are quantitatively similar. Moreover, a recent study
by Giglio et al. (2020) uses surveys to elicit beliefs of a large panel of retail investors who have
substantial wealth invested in financial markets and shows that these self-reported beliefs indeed
affect investors’ portfolio choices. Given this assumption, we present a simple model in which
a fraction of investors have extrapolative beliefs about stock returns. The model makes specific
predictions regarding the heterogeneity of return predictability in the cross-section. We empirically
test and confirm these predictions.
Finally, we evaluate the economic magnitude of the return predictability of extrapolative beliefs
using trading strategies, both in sample among stocks covered on Forcerank and out of sample
among all stocks over a longer period. Across different specifications, our trading strategies generate
risk-adjusted profits that are economically significant.
4.1. Return predictability of consensus beliefs
We first examine whether the consensus beliefs of Forcerank users are accurate or systemati-
cally biased. We address this question using Fama-MacBeth forecasting regressions, in which the
dependent variable is the daily return of an individual stock over the next week. Panel A of Table 7
reports these regression results.
18
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144849
[Place Table 7 about here]
As Column (1) shows, the consensus Forcerank scores significantly predict the next week’s
stock returns with a negative sign. This return predictability can arise from extrapolative beliefs—
investors form expectations about future returns by extrapolating from recent past returns—or it
can arise from general “sentiment” above and beyond return extrapolation. To understand the
source of the return predictability, we further decompose the Forcerank score into two components:
a predicted score and the residual. The predicted score is computed as the fitted value from the
nonlinear regression in Eq. (2) using contest-adjusted past returns as the explanatory variables. In
other words, it is the weighted average of past 12 weekly returns that best predicts the Forcerank
score. The residual of this regression is labeled as the residual score.
Column (2) shows that the predicted score also significantly predicts future stock returns with
a negative sign. The magnitude of the regression coefficient on the predicted score is slightly
greater than that on the raw Forcerank score from Column (1). Also note that, although past
returns altogether explain only about 6% of the variation in the Forcerank score, they contribute
significantly to the predictive power of the Forcerank score for future stock returns.
Of course, a large literature on the short-term return reversal has already shown that the
past return of a stock negatively predicts its future return and this reversal can be driven by
liquidity shocks unrelated to return extrapolation (see Jegadeesh and Titman, 1995 and Campbell,
Grossman, and Wang, 1993, among others). Given this literature, a natural question is whether
the predictive power of the Forcerank score simply reflects liquidity-shock-induced return reversals.
A priori, we do not expect liquidity shocks to be the main explanation for return predictability
because stocks in our sample tend to be very large stocks, as seen in Table 2.
To directly address this question, we examine the short-term return reversal explicitly in re-
gressions. For an apple-to-apple comparison, we convert each stock’s contest-adjusted past return
into a decile rank.13 The contest-adjusted return is either over the past one-week return (Ret(t)),
the past one-month return (Ret(t − 3, t)), or the past one-quarter return (Ret(t − 11, t)). Con-
test adjustment effectively controls for the industry-level return, hence making past returns more
13This conversion allows us to better compare the regression results with those using the Forcerank (ranking) score,
the predicted score, or the residual score as the explanatory variable.
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likely to predict future return reversals.14 Nonetheless, Columns (4) and (6) show that neither the
past one-week return nor the past one-quarter return has significant predictive power for the next
week’s return, even after contest adjustment. Column (5) shows that the past one-month return
has significant predictive power for the next week’s return. Overall, the evidence suggests that only
a weak standard short-term return reversal is present in our sample. More important, Columns (7)
and (8) show that the Forcerank score and the predicted score both drive out past-return measures
when they are included in the same regression.
Finally, we examine the predictive power of the residual score for future stock returns. By
construction, the residual score is orthogonal to past returns. Interestingly, Columns (3) and
(9) show that the residual score also negatively predicts the next week’s return, with or without
controlling for past returns. This finding suggests that the predictive power of the Forcerank score is
not completely driven by its association with past returns. The Forcerank score contains additional
information about investor “sentiment” above and beyond return extrapolation.
Panel B of Table 7 contains various robustness checks where Forcerank-based score variables
are horseraced against continuous variables of past returns and dummy variables that represent
extreme past returns in the top or the bottom decile; Atkins and Dyl (1990) and Kumar, Ruenzi,
and Ungeheuer (2019), among others, demonstrate that extreme winners and losers can dispro-
portionately drive short-term return reversals.15 In addition, stock characteristics such as size
and book-to-market ratio are also controlled for in the regressions. The predictive power of the
Forcerank score and the predicted score remains significant with all the controls; it is not driven
by extreme past returns over any specific horizons. The horserace in Column (6) is particularly
interesting. The past one-quarter return can be viewed as an equal-weighted average of past 12
weekly returns, whereas the predicted score is a weighted average of the same past 12 weekly re-
turns with the weights calibrated to extrapolative beliefs. The fact that the predicted score drives
out the past one-quarter return supports the predictions of the extrapolation model we describe in
Appendix A. The last three columns show that the predictive power of the residual score remains
significant except when the past one-quarter return and its extreme value dummies are present.
14Da, Liu, and Schaumburg (2013) show that, compared to sorting stocks across industries, sorting stocks within
an industry gives rise to stronger return reversals.
15Extreme winners and losers can be particularly salient to investors due to regular coverage by financial media.
As a result, the attention-induced price pressure can amplify return reversals.
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In unreported tests, we further examine the fundamental predictability of Forcerank scores.
After controlling for past returns and past fundamentals (proxied by analyst earnings forecast
revisions and earnings surprises), we find Forcerank scores to predict neither the standardized
earnings surprise (SUE) nor the analyst-consensus-based earnings surprise in the next quarter. The
lack of fundamental predictability, combined with Forcerank scores’ negative return predictability,
reinforces the notion that the beliefs of Forcerank users are systematically biased.
In summary, Table 7 shows that the Forcerank score, its component that is related to past
returns, and the residual component all significantly predict the next week’s stock returns with a
negative sign. In addition, these return predictability results remain strong after controlling for
returns over the past one week, one month, and one quarter, among other variables. Altogether,
our results show that the beliefs of Forcerank participants are systematically biased: when these
participants are optimistic about future stock returns, returns tend to be low, on average; conversely,
when they are pessimistic about future stock returns, returns tend to be high, on average. As such,
extrapolative expectation can be another important contributor to the well-documented short-term
return reversal phenomenon, consistent with Subrahmanyam (2005).
4.2. Heterogeneity of return predictability
Given that our sample only includes 1,045 distinct Forcerank users, we do not claim that these
users alone move stock prices, nor that they represent all the market participants. Instead, we
interpret our evidence as suggesting that the beliefs of these Forcerank users represent the thinking
process of a broader group of behavioral investors in the market.
By assuming that the beliefs of the Forcerank users are representative of the beliefs of a broader
investor population, we can now study the asset pricing implications of these biased beliefs. To do
so, we develop a cross-sectional model of return extrapolation. The model features two types of
agent, extrapolators and fundamental traders. Extrapolators form expectations about the future
stock returns by extrapolating from the recent past returns, and they trade stocks based on these
extrapolative beliefs. Fundamental traders, on the other hand, serve as arbitrageurs who correct
for mispricing. We leave the detail of the model in Appendix A.
Importantly, the model makes two specific predictions regarding the cross-sectional heterogene-
ity of return predictability. First, return predictability should be stronger among stocks whose
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clienteles are dominated by behavioral extrapolators. Second, return predictability should also be
stronger among stocks with a higher degree of extrapolation—this is measured by λi,1(1− λi,2) for
stock i in the model. In this section, we empirically test and confirm these two predictions.
[Place Table 8 about here]
First, we use institutional ownership to measure a stock’s clientele of fundamental traders:
stocks whose clienteles are dominated by extrapolators are assumed to have low institutional
ownership. In Panel A of Table 8, we run Fama-MacBeth forecasting regressions separately for
stocks with below-median institutional ownership—we assume these stocks are traded more by
extrapolators—and for stocks with above-median institutional ownership—we assume these stocks
are traded less by extrapolators. Consistent with the model prediction, our results show that the
return predictability of the Forcerank score and the predicted score is only present among stocks
with low institutional ownership.
Second, for each stock i, we estimate λi,1 and λi,2 based on the nonlinear regression in Eq. (2).
We then follow the model and use λi,1(1 − λi,2) to measure stock i’s degree of extrapolation.
Panel B of Table 8 runs Fama-MacBeth regressions separately for stocks with below-median degree
of extrapolation and for stocks with above-median degree of extrapolation. The results confirm
the model prediction that the Forcerank score and the predicted score both have much stronger
predictive power for the future returns of stocks that have a higher degree of extrapolation.
4.3. Trading strategies
To evaluate the economic significance of our return predictability results, we form trading
strategies. At the beginning of each week, we sort the stocks into five quintiles based on different
variables. The portfolio is rebalanced every week. Stocks with prices below $5 at the beginning of
the week are removed to reduce the impact of illiquidity. Panel A of Table 9 presents our results.
[Place Table 9 and Fig. 4 about here]
Row (1) sorts stocks based on the consensus Forcerank scores. It shows that Forcerank scores
negatively predict future stock returns: the low-score-minus-high-score return spread is 8.11 bps
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per day (t-value of 2.33).16 The return spread remains significant after risk adjustments using the
CAPM, the Fama-French five-factor model, or the five-factor model augmented with the momentum
factor and the short-term reversal factor. Moreover, our estimate of direct transaction cost for our
trading strategies, accounting for the bid-ask spread for the round-trip trades with an average
weekly portfolio turnover rate of 50%, is 1.7 bps per day, which is far below the risk-adjusted
return spread of 7 bps per day. Therefore, the profits to our trading strategies are likely to survive
transaction costs.
Row (2) sorts stocks based on the predicted scores. It shows that predicted scores also negatively
predict future stock returns: the low-score-minus-high-score return spread is 6.51 bps per day (t-
value of 2.01). The return spread remains significant even after controlling for the Fama-French
five factors, the momentum factor, and the short-term reversal factor. The seven-factor alpha is
still 5.47 bps per day (t-value of 1.70).
Row (3) shows that the predictive power of the residual score for future stock returns is slightly
larger than that of the predicted score. The low-score-minus-high-score return spread is 6.89 bps per
day (t-value of 2.07). The return spread remains significant after controlling for the Fama-French
five factors, the momentum factor, and the short-term reversal factor. The seven-factor alpha is
6.67 bps per day (t-value of 2.01). In other words, the Forcerank score contains information about
investor sentiment above and beyond return extrapolation.
Rows (4) and (5) show that the standard short-term return reversals are actually not eco-
nomically significant in our sample. Neither sorting on past one-week returns nor sorting on past
one-month returns generates a significant return spread, even though Table 7 Panel A showed that
past one-month returns negatively predict future returns at the 5% significance level.
Next, we examine how the performance of the trading strategies evolves over time. Fig. 4 plots
the daily cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the first two weeks after forming the trading
strategy based on either the Forcerank score (solid-circle line) or the predicted score (solid line).
The daily abnormal returns are estimated using the Fama-French five-factor model augmented with
the momentum factor and the short-term reversal factor. The CAR plot demonstrates that returns
for trading strategies accrue gradually over time, instead of coming exclusively from the first day
16Consistent with our prior analyses, the Forcerank scores are computed using all individual rankings during a
contest, including those submitted after the closing time on Friday. Removing these late rankings does not alter our
return predictability results but makes our trading strategy implementable in real time.
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since portfolio formation. As such, our return predictability results clearly go beyond the bid-ask
bounce and other market microstructure effects.
Finally, we examine the generalizability of our return predictability results. We conduct an out-
of-sample validation test by studying return predictability among all stocks—not just those covered
by the Forcerank platform—over a longer period from April 9, 2001 to December 31, 2017.17 If the
beliefs of Forcerank users represent the thinking process of a broader group of behavioral investors in
the market, we would expect that the predicted scores for non-Forcerank stocks also have predictive
power for the future returns of these stocks.
For each stock in each week, we first compute a predicted score as the fitted value from the
nonlinear regression in Eq. (2); we use the stock’s industry-adjusted returns over the past 12 weeks
as the explanatory variables, and we use the estimates of λ1 and λ2 from Column (2) of Table 4 to
construct the weights in Eq. (2). We also compute a second predicted score (called “PN”) as the
fitted value from the nonlinear regression in Eq. (3), allowing for the asymmetry between positive
and negative past returns when estimating λ1 and λ2; we use the estimates of λ1,p, λ2,p, λ1,n, and
λ2,n from Column (1) of Table 5 to construct the weights in Eq. (3). To evaluate the economic
magnitude of the return predictability, we examine trading strategies that are similar to those in
Panel A. Stocks with prices below $5 at the beginning of the week are removed to reduce the impact
of illiquidity. The results are reported in Panels B and C of Table 9.
Row (1) of Panel B sorts all the stocks based on their predicted scores and reports the top-
and bottom-decile portfolio performance of the daily return over the next week. The low-score-
minus-high-score return spread is 24.4 bps per day (t-value of 14.29). The spread remains highly
significant after various risk adjustments. Row (2) shows that allowing the asymmetry between
positive and negative past returns in constructing the predicted scores further increases the return
spread.
As a comparison, Rows (3) and (4) of Panel B report the performance of the standard industry-
neutral short-term return reversal strategies that sort on past one-week returns or past one-month
returns. Although the return spreads produced by these trading strategies are also statistically
significant, they are smaller in magnitude relative to those in Rows (1) and (2). In other words,
17The starting date of the out-of-sample period is the date of full implementation of decimalization for all equities
and options on exchanges. We chose this date to alleviate the concern that our analysis simply captures the short-term
return reversal due to the bid-ask bounce or other liquidity issues.
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extrapolative beliefs, by applying declining weights to past weekly returns and by allowing for
different weights on positive and negative past returns, predict future returns better than past
one-week returns and past one-month returns.
To further alleviate the concern that our return predictability is simply due to liquidity shocks,
we repeat the trading strategies from Panel B but only among the largest stocks (those in the top
CRSP size quintile). These stocks are least likely to be affected by illiquidity. Panel C shows that,
even among this subset of large-cap stocks, the predicted scores still outperform past one-week and
one-month returns.
5. Conclusion
Taking advantage of novel data from Forcerank, a crowdsourcing platform for ranking stocks, we
provide strong empirical evidence that investors extrapolate from recent past returns of individual
stocks when forming expectations about future returns. We then study how investors extrapolate.
We find that extrapolation is asymmetric between positive and negative past returns: investors put
more weight on negative past returns, and this weight decays more slowly into the past for these
negative returns. The weight also decays more slowly for a more dispersed cross-section of past
returns. Finally, investor expectations respond more strongly to salient past returns, and salient
returns from both the recent past and the distant past affect investor expectations. Moreover, we
examine the effect of user and firm characteristics on expectation formation. We find a stronger
degree of extrapolation among users who are not financial professionals. We also find that extrap-
olation is affected by firm characteristics such as size, book-to-market ratio, return volatility, and
turnover.
Next, we examine whether the return expectations from Forcerank users are accurate or sys-
tematically biased. We show that the consensus Forcerank score significantly predicts future stock
returns with a negative sign. Furthermore, we decompose the Forcerank score into two components:
a predicted component explained by past returns and the residual component orthogonal to the
past returns. We find that both components negatively predict future stock returns. Altogether,
our results suggest that beliefs of Forcerank users are systematically biased.
Finally, we examine additional asset pricing implications of these biased beliefs. In the cross-
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section, we find that return predictability of the Forcerank score is stronger among stocks with lower
institutional ownership and a higher degree of extrapolation. This heterogeneity is consistent with
the predictions of a cross-sectional model of return extrapolation. We also form weekly rebalanced
trading strategies to evaluate the economic magnitude of the return predictability of extrapolative
beliefs, both in sample among stocks covered by the Forcerank platform and out of sample among
all stocks over a longer period. Across different specifications, the risk-adjusted profits generated
by our trading strategies are economically significant.
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Appendix A. A cross-sectional model with return
extrapolation
There are a number of extrapolation models that try to explain empirical facts about the
aggregate stock market. However, few extrapolation models have been developed for the cross-
section of individual stocks.18 In this section, we study the asset pricing implications of a simple
cross-sectional model that features some investors who extrapolate from a stock’s recent past returns
when forming beliefs about its future return.
We consider a finite-horizon economy with T + 1 dates, t = 0, 1, . . ., T . There are N + 1 assets:
a risk-free asset whose interest rate is normalized to zero and N risky assets. Risky asset i is a
claim to a single dividend payment at the terminal date, and the payment equals
Di,T = Di,0 + εi,1 + . . .+ εi,T , (A.1)
where
εi,t = ζi · εM,t + ηi,t,
εM,t ∼ N (0, σ2M ), ηi,t ∼ N (0, σ2i ), i.i.d. over time and across stocks.
(A.2)
The value of Di,0 is public information at time 0. Both the market-wide news εM,t and the firm-
specific news ηi,t become public at time t. The fundamental news of risky asset i has a loading of ζi
on the market-wide news. The price of this asset, Pi,t, is endogenously determined in equilibrium,
and its supply is fixed at Qi.
There are two types of agent, fundamental traders and extrapolators. Fundamental traders
make up a population fraction µf of the economy, and extrapolators make up a population fraction
µe of the economy; µe = 1− µf . Both types of agent maximize their expected utility defined over
the next period’s wealth with constant absolute risk aversion γ. The key behavioral assumption of
18Barberis and Shleifer (2003) develop a cross-sectional extrapolation model to study comovement within and
across investment styles. The focus of our model, however, is to study expectation formation and its asset pricing
implications at the individual stock level.
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the model is that, for risky asset i,
Eet [P̃i,t+1 − Pi,t] = λi,0 + λi,1Si,t, (A.3)
where λi,1 > 0, λi,2 ∈ (0, 1) and
Si,t ≡ (1− λi,2)
∞∑
k=0
(λi,2)
k(Pi,t−k − Pi,t−k−1). (A.4)
That is, extrapolators’ time-t expectation about the price change of risky asset i over the next
period is a linear function of the (normalized) weighted average of all past price changes; we call
this weighted average of past price changes “sentiment” Si,t.
19 The parameter λi,1 measures the
overall effect of past price changes on extrapolator beliefs. The parameter λi,2 measures the weight
an extrapolator puts on recent price changes relative to distant price changes. Empirically, the
Forcerank data allow us to estimate the belief parameters λi,1 and λi,2.
20 We provide a detailed
discussion of these parameters in Sections 3 and 4 of the main text.
Next, we derive the share demand for the two types of agent. We begin with fundamen-
tal traders. As mentioned above, each fundamental trader has a constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) utility function defined over her next period’s wealth. At time t, she chooses her per
capita share demand Nft on the risky assets to maximize
max
Nft
Eft
[
−e−γ(W
f
t +(P̃ t+1−Pt)′N
f
t )
]
, (A.5)
which implies
Nft =
1
γ
(Σft )
−1(Eft [P̃t+1]− Pt), (A.6)
where Σft is the variance-covariance matrix of the next period’s price changes perceived by funda-
19Since our economy begins at t = 0, we can also write sentiment as
Si,t = (1− λi,2)
t−1∑
k=0
(λi,2)
k(Pi,t−k − Pi,t−k−1) + (λi,2)tSi,0,
where Si,0 represents the initial level of sentiment at t = 0, summarizing the weighted average of past price changes
from t = −∞ to t = 0.
20When we use a consensus Forcerank score instead of Eet [P̃i,t+1 − Pi,t] as the dependent variable in Eq. (A.3), we
will be able to estimate λi,1 up to an affine transformation.
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mental traders at time t and Pt = (P1,t, P2,t, . . . , PN−1,t, PN,t)
′. We assume
(Σft )i,j = Σi,j ≡

ζ2i σ
2
M + σ
2
i i = j
ζiζjσ
2
M i 6= j
. (A.7)
That is, for simplicity, we assume that fundamental traders believe that the covariance for changes
in price is the same as the covariance for changes in fundamentals.
Applying Eq. (A.6) at time T − 1, and noting that at the terminal date T , PT = DT ≡
(D1,T , D2,T , . . . , DN−1,T , DN,T )
′, we obtain
NfT−1 =
1
γ
Σ−1(DT−1 − PT−1). (A.8)
Eq. (A.8) and market clearing together imply
µf
1
γ
Σ−1(DT−1 − PT−1) + µeN eT−1 = Q, (A.9)
where Q ≡ (Q1, Q2, . . . , QN−1, QN )′ and N eT−1 is extrapolators’ per capita share demand on the
risky assets at time T − 1. Rearranging terms gives
PT−1 = DT−1 − (µf )−1γΣ(Q− µeN eT−1). (A.10)
We further impose
Eft (N
f
t+1) = Q. (A.11)
This is a bounded rationality assumption, which says that fundamental traders do not directly
compute investors’ future demands. Instead, they expect that all market participants will demand
the per capita supply of the risky assets in the next period.
Eqs. (A.6), (A.10), and (A.11) together give
NfT−2 =
1
γ
Σ−1(EfT−2[P̃T−1]− PT−2) =
1
γ
Σ−1(DT−2 − γΣQ− PT−2). (A.12)
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Recursively, the time-t per capita share demand of fundamental traders is
Nft =
1
γ
Σ−1(Dt − γ(T − t− 1)ΣQ− Pt), (A.13)
where Dt ≡ (D1,t, D2,t, . . . , DN−1,t, DN,t)′ and Di,t ≡ Di,0 + εi,1 + . . .+ εi,t for risky asset i.
We now derive the share demand of extrapolators. Each extrapolator has a CARA utility
function defined over her next period’s wealth. At time t, she chooses her per capita share demand
N et on the risky assets to maximize
max
Net
Eet
[
−e−γ(W et +(P̃ t+1−Pt)′Net )
]
, (A.14)
which implies
N et =
1
γ
(Σet )
−1(Eet [P̃t+1]− Pt), (A.15)
where Σet is the variance-covariance matrix of the next period’s price changes perceived by extrap-
olators at time t. We further assume21
Σet = Σ
f
t = Σ. (A.16)
Eqs. (A.3), (A.4), (A.15), and (A.16) together imply that the time-t per capita share demand
of extrapolators is
N et =
1
γ
Σ−1Xt, (A.17)
where Xt ≡ (λ1,0 + λ1,1S1,t, λ2,0 + λ2,1S2,t, . . . , λN−1,0 + λN−1,1SN−1,t, λN,0 + λN,1SN,t)′.
Intuitively, Eq. (A.17) shows that extrapolator demand is positively related to the levels of
sentiment: when stocks’ recent past returns are high, extrapolators expect high stock returns
moving forward, pushing up their current share demand. On the other hand, Eq. (A.13) indicates
that fundamental traders serve as arbitrageurs who correct for mispricing: their share demand is
positively related to the fundamental value of the risky assets but is negatively related to the risky
asset prices.
21Early work of Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Barberis et al. (2018) has also made the simplifying assumptions
of Eqs. (A.11) and (A.16).
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The share demands (A.13) and (A.17), together with market clearing, imply that the equilibrium
price of risky asset i is22
Pi,t =
1
1− (µe/µf )λi,1(1− λi,2)
Di,t
+
µe/µf
1− (µe/µf )λi,1(1− λi,2)
(λi,0 + λi,1λi,2Si,t−1 − λi,1(1− λi,2)Pi,t−1)
− (γ(T − t− 1)ΣQ+ (µ
f )−1γΣQ)i
1− (µe/µf )λi,1(1− λi,2)
. (A.18)
Eq. (A.18) demonstrates an amplification mechanism: the good fundamental news at time t—an
increase from Di,t−1 to Di,t—pushes up the price Pi,t for risky asset i, causing extrapolators to
become more optimistic about the asset’s future return and hence increasing their share demand.
This in turn pushes the price Pi,t further up. The amplification mechanism implies that equilibrium
only exists if
(µe/µf )λi,1(1− λi,2) < 1. (A.19)
This inequality holds under two conditions. First, there needs to be a sufficient population fraction
of fundamental traders in the economy who trade against mispricing (i.e., µf/µe needs to be
sufficiently large). Second, λi,1(1− λi,2)—what we define as extrapolators’ degree of extrapolation
for stock i—needs to be sufficiently small.
To understand the asset pricing implications of the model, we run the following predictive
regression of the future price change Pi,t+1 − Pi,t on the current sentiment Si,t:
Pi,t+1 − Pi,t = αi + bi · Si,t + ξi,t+1. (A.20)
The price equation in Eq. (A.18) implies αi = (1− (µe/µf )λi,1(1− λi,2))−1γ(ΣQ)i and ξi,t+1 =
22Cross-asset extrapolation does not arise in our model. There are two reasons for this. First, we assume CARA
preferences for fundamental traders and extrapolators; these preferences eliminate any wealth effect and rebalancing
motives. Second, we assume bounded rationality on the part of fundamental traders—these traders always expect
mispricing for all risky assets to be corrected over the next period—and therefore further eliminate any hedging
motives. Given these two assumptions, our cross-sectional model of return extrapolation reduces to a model of return
extrapolation on individual stocks: the price of stock i in Eq. (A.18) only depends on its own past prices but not on
the past prices of other stocks.
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(1− (µe/µf )λi,1(1− λi,2))−1εi,t+1. More importantly, the slope coefficient in Eq. (A.20) equals
bi = −
(µe/µf )λi,1(1− λi,2)
1− (µe/µf )λi,1(1− λi,2)
, (A.21)
and bi < 0 if 0 < (µ
e/µf )λi,1(1− λi,2) < 1.
Note that extrapolators’ time-t sentiment Si,t for risky asset i is an expectation measure. Up
to an affine transformation, the empirical analog of Si,t is the predicted score of stock i: it is the
fitted value from the nonlinear regression in Eq. (2) of the main text using stock i’s consensus
Forcerank score as the dependent variable and using the stock’s contest-adjusted past returns
as the explanatory variables. The model predicts that the coefficient from regressing the future
stock return on the stock’s current predicted score—or on the stock’s current Forcerank score that
contains the predicted score as a component—should be negative. Moreover, the expression of bi
in Eq. (A.21) connects stock i’s return predictability with the belief parameters λi,1 and λi,2 from
extrapolators and the population fraction of extrapolators µe.
[Place Fig. A1 about here]
Fig. A1 shows that, for a higher µe or a higher λi,1(1−λi,2), the magnitude of the regression co-
efficient bi in Eq. (A.21) is larger. In other words, the model generates two predictions regarding the
heterogeneity of return predictability. First, return predictability should be stronger among stocks
whose clienteles are dominated by behavioral extrapolators—this is when µe is higher. Second,
return predictability should also be stronger among stocks traded by extrapolators whose degree
of extrapolation is higher—this is when λi,1(1 − λi,2) is higher. In Section 4 of the main text, we
use our cross-sectional expectation data to test and confirm these two model predictions.
We complete the discussion of the model by making a remark on the model’s ability to generate
momentum. Some extrapolation models—e.g., Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Barberis et al.
(2018)—give rise to both momentum and longer-term return reversals. Some other extrapolation
models—e.g., Barberis et al. (2015) and Jin and Sui (2019)—however, only generate return reversals.
The key difference lies in the models’ assumption on the relation between extrapolators’ current
return expectation and past returns. If this relation is assumed to be hump-shaped—i.e., if we
regress the current model-implied return expectation on all past returns, the coefficients, when
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plotted against the passage time between the current time and the time when the past return took
place, display a hump shape—then the model generates both momentum and reversals. If, on the
other hand, this relation is assumed to be monotonically decreasing, and furthermore, if there is no
gap in time between belief formation and trading, then the model only generates reversals. In the
end, the relation between the current return expectation and past returns needs to be measured
empirically. As we show in Section 3 of the main text, our weekly expectations data indeed find
this relation to be monotonically decreasing. This in turn justifies our key belief assumption in
Eqs. (A.3) and (A.4). Moreover, consistent with the asset pricing implication of this documented
monotonic relation, we only observe return reversals, instead of both momentum and reversals, at
the weekly horizon.
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Fig. A1. Relation between return predictability and parameters µe, λi,1, and λi,2. The figures
analyze the slope coefficient bi in the predictive regression
Pi,t+1 − Pi,t = αi + bi · Si,t + ξi,t+1
specified in Eq. (A.20) of the Appendix, where Si,t, as defined in Eq. (A.4), is extrapolators’
time-t “sentiment” on stock i. Panel A plots bi as a function of µ
e, the population fraction of
extrapolators in the economy. Panel B plots bi as a function of λi,1(1− λi,2), our model-implied
measure of extrapolators’ degree of extrapolation for stock i. The default parameter values are
λi,1 = 1, λi,2 = 0.4, and µ
e = 0.5.
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Appendix B. Additional discussion about time-scale invariance
Time-scale invariance refers to the hypothesis that memory retrieval is invariant across different
time scales. The psychology literature has documented experimental evidence for this hypothesis
(see, e.g., Maylor, Chater, and Brown, 2001 and Moreton and Ward, 2010). Survey data about
investor expectations provide further empirical support for time-scale invariance. From Column
(1) of Table 4, an estimate of 0.59 for λ2 suggests that, when forming expectations about the next
week’s return, investors put 12% weight on returns four weeks earlier relative to returns in the most
recent week; the ratio of the forecasting horizon (one week) to the backward-looking time window
of expectation formation (four weeks) is about one over four. In comparison, Barberis et al. (2015)
report a similar estimate of 0.61 for λ2 using Gallup data in which investors make longer-term
forecasts, suggesting that when forming expectations about the next year’s return, investors put
14% weight on returns four years earlier relative to returns in the most recent year; while the
forecasting horizon is now one year rather than one week, the ratio of the forecasting horizon to the
backward-looking time window remains to be one over four.23 This numerical comparison shows
stability in the estimation of belief parameters after adjusting for time horizons. It suggests that
our findings about expectation formation are not restricted to a short forecasting horizon; it also
has direct implications for the formation of expectations over longer forecasting horizons.
23Specifically, the estimate of λ2 is based on λ2 = exp(−0.49 × 1) ≈ 0.61, where 0.49 is the estimate of the
extrapolation parameter, a coefficient in the exponent, from Barberis et al. (2015), and 1 corresponds to the one-year
time interval between consecutive past annual returns.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the Forcerank interface. The figure on the left presents a screenshot of the
interface for a contest for ranking ten stocks from the e-commerce industry, taken on Thursday,
June 16, 2016. The participant is asked to rank ten stocks based on her expectations of these
stocks’ returns over the subsequent “evaluation” week (from 9:30 am June 20, 2016 to 4:00 pm
June 24, 2016). The current time is 11:44 am, and the time remaining to enter the rankings is
three days 21 hours 45 minutes and 45 seconds. The participant could vertically drag the bars
next to the company names to rank these stocks. The figure on the right presents a screenshot of
the scoring page for a different contest during its “evaluation” week. The right column under
“Live” displays the actual rankings of the stocks based on their realized returns thus far (since the
beginning of the evaluation week). The left column under “Your Forcerank” shows the rankings
submitted by the user “Aaron” with the corresponding live points earned from this contest. The
point next to each stock is based on the difference between the user’s ranking and the actual
ranking: a larger difference leads to a lower point. In addition, a higher point is given to a more
accurate ranking for the top-ranked stock or the bottom-ranked stock. The “live points” become
“final points” for this contest when the evaluation week ends at 4:00 pm on Friday.
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Fig. 2. Extrapolative beliefs: Forcerank scores versus initial buys. The figure plots the coefficient
estimates from regressing the consensus Forcerank score on past 12 weekly returns (left y-axis)
and the coefficient estimates from regressing the initial buys of retail investors on past 12 weekly
returns (right y-axis). Initial buys are measured using individual-level transaction records from a
large discount brokerage firm over the period from January 1991 to December 1996 (as in Barber
and Odean, 2000). In the initial buy regression, the dependent variable is an indicator that equals
one for week t if, during that week, there is at least one retail investor who purchased the stock
for the first time in the sample. The initial buys are based on the trades of frequent traders whose
median time of a round-trip trade is less than ten days; the round-trip time is computed as the
time gap between each sale and its most recent purchase. Investors who have less than ten
round-trip trades are removed from the sample. The solid line and the solid-circle line correspond
to the coefficient estimates. The dashed lines and the dash-dot lines correspond to the 95%
confidence level.
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Fig. 3. Estimates of λ1 and λ2 and the number of lagged returns included. The figure plots the
estimates of λ1 and λ2, each as a function of n+ 1, the total number of lagged weekly returns
included in the nonlinear regression specified in Eq. (2) of the main text:
Forceranki,t = λ0 + λ1 ·
∑n
s=0
wsRi,t−s + εi,t, where ws =
λs2∑n
j=0 λ
j
2
, 0 ≤ λ2 < 1.
42
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144849
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
CAR from Forcerank scores
CAR from predicted scores
Fig. 4. Trading strategies: daily CAR plot. The figure plots the daily cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) over the first two weeks after forming the trading strategy based on either the
Forcerank score or the predicted score. At the beginning of every calendar week, the stocks are
ranked in an ascending order into five quintiles on the basis of their consensus Forcerank scores or
the predicted scores (the fitted values from the nonlinear regression in Eq. (2) of the main text
using contest-adjusted past returns as the explanatory variables) over the past week. The
solid-circle (solid) line corresponds to the trading strategy that buys stocks with low Forcerank
scores (predicted scores) and sells stocks with high Forcerank scores (predicted scores). The
stocks are equally weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolio is rebalanced every
calendar week. The daily abnormal returns are estimated using the Fama-French five-factor
model augmented with the momentum factor and the short-term reversal factor. The dashed lines
and the dash-dot lines correspond to the 95% confidence level.
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Table 1
Games and contests in the sample.
The table presents the number of contests for different types of game in our sample. Each game consists of ten stocks,
all of which share one or multiple specific characteristics. Most games are repeatedly conducted over time on the
platform, resulting in multiple weekly contests for a given game. There are two main types of game in our sample:
1) industry games, which include stocks in a specific sector or industry; and 2) games with the most heavily shorted
stocks, which include stocks with high short interest in the past month. In the final row under industry games, other
industries include chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and oil services.
Types of game Number of contests
Industry 1,318
Enterprise software (large: 69; mid/small: 67) 136
Biotech (large: 95; mid: 20) 115
Social media 111
E-commerce 108
Apparel 101
E&P (large) 96
Hardware 88
Fast food 69
Media 69
Airlines 68
Investment banks 68
Semiconductors (large) 65
Restaurants 64
Others 160
Most heavily shorted (March 2016 to December 2017) 78
Total 1,396
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Table 2
Summary statistics of stocks and users in the sample.
The table presents descriptive statistics for stocks and users in our sample. Panel A reports firm-week-level financial
characteristics and user-level participation characteristics. Financial characteristics include size, book-to-market ratio
(B/M), and institutional ownership (IO). The size and B/M quintile groups are obtained by matching each firm-
week observation from July of year t to June of year t+ 1 with one of the 25 Fama-French size and B/M portfolios
based on 1) market capitalization at the end of June of year t and 2) the book equity of the fiscal year t− 1 divided
by the market value of the equity at the end of December of year t− 1. Panel B reports the distribution of users in
our sample by their professions; we only observe the self-reported professional background among a fraction of users
who registered before March 2017.
Panel A: Stock and user characteristics
Firm-week-level financial characteristics (Number of observations N = 11,140)
mean sd p1 p25 p50 p75 p99
Size (in million) 56,602.77 102,785.18 600.73 3,949.91 15,413.54 53,054.52 515,586.56
B/M 0.37 0.37 0.01 0.15 0.26 0.47 1.55
Size quntile 4.20 1.08 2.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
B/M quintile 2.20 1.31 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00
IO 0.48 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.75 1.00
User-level participation characteristics (Number of observations N = 1,045)
mean sd p1 p25 p50 p75 p99
Number of games 4.39 6.61 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 31.00
Number of contests 18.85 88.01 1.00 1.00 3.00 8.00 355.00
Number of weeks 3.71 6.59 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 38.00
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Panel B: User background
Frequency Percent
Financial professional (N = 72)
Sell side 47 7.76
Buy side 14 2.31
Independent 11 1.82
Nonprofessional (N = 172)
Financials 6 0.99
Academia 1 0.17
Consumer discretionary 5 0.83
Consumer staples 2 0.33
Energy 1 0.17
Healthcare 6 0.99
Industrials 1 0.17
Information technology 22 3.63
Materials 4 0.66
Student 124 20.46
Missing 362 59.74
Total 606 100.00
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Table 3
Extrapolative beliefs: linear regression model.
The table presents the results of a contest-level linear regression specified in Eq. (1) of the main text. The dependent
variable is the consensus ranking (one to ten)—a stock’s average ranking across all individuals: the highest ranked
stock receives a score of ten, and the lowest ranked stock receives a score of one. The explanatory variables include
lagged returns from week t − 11 to week t. Column (1) uses the raw level of past stock returns. Columns (2) and
onwards focus on contest-adjusted returns (i.e., the stock return in excess of the average return of the ten stocks in the
contest). Columns (3) and (4) separately examine the idiosyncratic and systematic components of past stock returns
(according to the CAPM). Column (5) uses an ordered logit regression. Column (6) converts the explanatory variables
from past weekly returns to the stocks’ actual past rankings. Columns (7) and (8) repeat the analysis in Column (2)
separately for the first half (before March 1, 2017) and the second half (after March 1, 2017) of our sample period.
Finally, Column (9) includes controls such as tones of news coverage and the stock’s CAPM expected returns from
the previous 12 weeks as well as past fundamentals measured by monthly revisions in consensus earnings forecasts
(or, during the earnings announcement months, by the actual earnings surprises) from the previous 12 months. The
standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. var: Forcerank score
level adj idio sys ord. logit ranking 1st half 2nd half w controls
Ret(t) 11.21*** 16.98*** 13.02*** –4.352* 11.95*** 0.276*** 17.83*** 19.10*** 18.92***
(0.559) (0.684) (0.697) (2.223) (0.476) (0.009) (0.963) (1.060) (0.820)
Ret(t− 1) 3.298*** 5.139*** 3.105*** –5.144** 3.479*** 0.0723*** 6.601*** 3.897*** 4.891***
(0.555) (0.679) (0.696) (2.173) (0.448) (0.009) (0.953) (1.058) (0.817)
Ret(t− 2) 3.150*** 4.327*** 3.346*** –5.083** 2.845*** 0.0558*** 3.993*** 4.883*** 4.559***
(0.560) (0.688) (0.698) (2.131) (0.445) (0.009) (0.960) (1.060) (0.817)
Ret(t− 3) 2.025*** 2.821*** 1.625** –6.398*** 2.013*** 0.0486*** 3.677*** 2.363** 2.406***
(0.565) (0.694) (0.705) (2.103) (0.453) (0.009) (0.968) (1.071) (0.830)
Ret(t− 4) 2.590*** 3.703*** 2.906*** –4.580** 2.589*** 0.0556*** 4.150*** 4.174*** 3.754***
(0.564) (0.695) (0.707) (2.049) (0.455) (0.009) (0.973) (1.070) (0.829)
Ret(t− 5) 1.911*** 2.259*** 1.920*** –4.114** 1.485*** 0.0457*** 1.616* 3.265*** 2.080**
(0.559) (0.689) (0.710) (2.038) (0.454) (0.009) (0.958) (1.072) (0.830)
Ret(t− 6) 0.785 1.188* 1.557** –3.848* 1.110** 0.0363*** –0.197 3.952*** 2.030**
(0.542) (0.668) (0.698) (1.991) (0.443) (0.009) (0.946) (1.054) (0.814)
Ret(t− 7) 2.146*** 3.669*** 3.170*** –2.896 2.489*** 0.0541*** 2.418** 5.894*** 4.687***
(0.541) (0.668) (0.698) (1.986) (0.445) (0.009) (0.946) (1.054) (0.814)
Ret(t− 8) 0.651 1.503** 1.087 –3.862** 1.171*** 0.0251*** 0.219 3.446*** 1.294
(0.542) (0.679) (0.692) (1.933) (0.444) (0.009) (0.949) (1.062) (0.812)
Ret(t− 9) 1.575*** 2.466*** 2.196*** –2.617 1.732*** 0.0431*** 1.579* 3.903*** 2.588***
(0.535) (0.669) (0.688) (1.909) (0.442) (0.009) (0.922) (1.079) (0.806)
Ret(t− 10) 1.339** 1.529** 1.507** –4.435** 1.125** 0.0246*** 0.206 3.706*** 1.640**
(0.520) (0.659) (0.688) (1.837) (0.443) (0.009) (0.898) (1.113) (0.804)
Ret(t− 11) 0.838 0.812 0.633 –3.695** 0.498 0.0140 –0.126 2.258** 0.319
(0.516) (0.652) (0.680) (1.796) (0.436) (0.009) (0.885) (1.098) (0.794)
Observations 12,010 12,010 10,362 10,362 12,010 12,050 5,542 6,468 10,170
R-squared 0.042 0.064 0.042 0.004 0.0157 0.099 0.074 0.069 0.114
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Table 4
Extrapolative beliefs: exponential decay model.
The table presents the results of a contest-level nonlinear regression specified in Eq. (2) of the main text:
Forceranki,t = λ0 + λ1 ·
∑n
s=0
wsRi,t−s + εi,t, where ws =
λs2∑n
j=0 λ
j
2
, 0 ≤ λ2 < 1.
The dependent variable is the consensus ranking (one to ten)—a stock’s average ranking across all individuals: the
highest ranked stock receives a score of ten, and the lowest ranked stock receives a score of one. The explanatory
variables include lagged returns from week t − 11 to week t. Column (1) uses the raw level of past stock returns.
Columns (2) and onwards focus on contest-adjusted returns (i.e., the stock return in excess of the average return
of the ten stocks in the contest). Column (3) uses the idiosyncratic component of past stock returns. Column (4)
converts the explanatory variables from past weekly returns to the stocks’ actual past rankings. Columns (5) and (6)
repeat the analysis in Column (2) separately for the first half (before March 1, 2017) and the second half (after March
1, 2017) of our sample period. Finally, Column (7) includes controls such as tones of news coverage and the stock’s
CAPM expected returns from the previous 12 weeks as well as past fundamentals measured by monthly revisions in
consensus earnings forecasts (or, during the earnings announcement months, by the actual earnings surprises) from
the previous 12 months. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Forcerank score
level adj idio ranking 1st half 2nd half w controls
λ0 5.401*** 5.498*** 5.578*** 2.789*** 5.491*** 5.503*** 4.576***
(0.027) (0.025) (0.028) (0.118) (0.037) (0.035) (0.067)
λ1 23.83*** 34.12*** 23.14*** 0.493*** 35.57*** 50.74*** 31.95***
(1.586) (1.820) (1.688) (0.021) (2.521) (3.460) (1.911)
λ2 0.590*** 0.549*** 0.484*** 0.471*** 0.534*** 0.739*** 0.443***
(0.030) (0.026) (0.039) (0.023) (0.035) (0.025) (0.033)
Observations 12,010 12,010 10,362 12,010 5,542 6,468 10,170
R-squared 0.037 0.056 0.036 0.085 0.070 0.052 0.106
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Table 5
Extrapolative beliefs: past return characteristics.
The table presents the results of contest-level nonlinear regressions for various past return characteristics. The
dependent variable in these regressions is the consensus Forcerank score. The explanatory variables are lagged
contest-adjusted returns. The regression in Column (1) is specified in Eq. (3) of the main text:
Forceranki,t = λ0 + λ1,p ·
∑n
s=0
1{Ri,t−s≥0} · ws,pRi,t−s
+λ1,n ·
∑n
s=0
1{Ri,t−s<0} · ws,nRi,t−s + εi,t,
where ws,p =
λs2,p∑n
j=0 λ
j
2,p
and ws,n =
λs2,n∑n
j=0 λ
j
2,n
. In other words, this regression allows λ1 and λ2 to differ across positive
(p) versus negative (n) returns of individual stocks. Similarly, the regression in Column (2) allows λ1 and λ2 to differ
across up (u) versus down (d) markets, where up (down) markets are defined as weeks when the market returns are
above (below) the median weekly market return in our sample period (0.23%). The regression in Column (3) allows λ1
and λ2 to differ across contest-weeks with dispersed (disp) versus close (close) returns. Contest-weeks with dispersed
(close) returns are those where the cross-sectional standard deviation of the ten stocks’ returns is above (below) the
median (2.77%). Finally, the regression in Column (4) allows λ1 and λ2 to differ across salient (s) versus nonsalient
(ns) returns. To measure the salience level associated with the return of stock i in week t, we count the number of
news articles written on that stock in that week. We obtain the news coverage data from RavenPack. To ensure that
extreme returns are not driving the variation in λ1 and λ2 mechanically, we orthogonalize news coverage with respect
to the absolute returns. Specifically, for each week in the sample period, we run a cross-sectional regression of the
total amount of news coverage of a stock on its absolute return over the same week. We then define a stock return as
salient (nonsalient) if the residual from this cross-sectional regression is above (below) median. The standard errors
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Forcerank score
λ0 6.213*** λ0 5.497*** λ0 5.498*** λ0 5.508***
(0.047) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
λ1,p 18.44*** λ1,u 27.63*** λ1,disp 31.10*** λ1,s 55.84***
(1.674) (2.242) (2.056) (3.462)
λ2,p 0.0538 λ2,u 0.387*** λ2,disp 0.564*** λ2,s 0.765***
(0.063) (0.048) (0.032) (0.021)
λ1,n 77.93*** λ1,d 50.39*** λ1,close 66.67*** λ1,ns 28.88***
(3.115) (3.067) (4.344) (2.038)
λ2,n 0.818*** λ2,d 0.700*** λ2,close 0.440*** λ2,ns 0.356***
(0.016) (0.024) (0.037) (0.043)
Observations 12,010 12,010 12,010 12,010
R-squared 0.081 0.062 0.072 0.063
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Table 6
Extrapolative beliefs: user and stock characteristics.
The table in Panel A presents the results of contest-level nonlinear regressions for financial professionals versus
nonprofessionals. The regression is specified in Eq. (2) of the main text. The dependent variable is a stock’s consensus
ranking averaged across professional users (Column (1)) or nonprofessional users (Column (2)). The highest ranked
stock receives a score of ten, and the lowest ranked stock receives a score of one. The explanatory variables include
lagged contest-adjusted returns from week t − 11 to week t. The table in Panel B analyzes how the extrapolation
parameters vary with firm characteristics. For each stock i, we estimate λi,1 and λi,2 from the following specification:
Forceranki,t = λi,0 + λi,1 ·
∑n
s=0
wi,sRi,t−s + εi,t, where wi,s =
λsi,2∑n
j=0 λ
j
i,2
, 0 ≤ λi,2 < 1.
Firms that appear for less than 30 weeks in our sample are removed from this analysis. The dependent variable is
λi,1 in Column (1) and λi,2 in Column (2). The explanatory variables include 1) `n(Size): the logarithm of a firm’s
market capitalization at the end of year 2015; 2) B/M : the book-to-market ratio, which is a firm’s book equity of
the fiscal year 2015 divided by its market value of the equity at the end of year 2015; 3) volatility: a firm’s average
weekly return volatility during our sample period; and 4) turnover: a firm’s average weekly turnover during our
sample period. The standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
Panel A: User characteristics
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Professionals Nonprofessionals
λ0 5.498*** 5.494***
(0.029) (0.028)
λ1 26.35*** 33.77***
(2.784) (2.055)
λ2 0.773*** 0.552***
(0.035) (0.030)
Observations 9,658 10,261
R-squared 0.015 0.050
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Panel B: Stock characteristics
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: λi,1 λi,2
`n(Size) 8.173** 0.066***
(4.074) (0.024)
B/M 7.034 –0.153*
(14.30) (0.083)
Volatility –12.03** –0.014
(5.221) (0.030)
Turnover 1.548 0.113**
(7.602) (0.044)
Observations 137 137
R-squared 0.174 0.101
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Table 7
Return predictability: Fama-MacBeth regressions.
This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth forecasting regressions. For each week t and each stock i, the dependent variable is the daily return of stock
i over week t + 1. Panel A compares various score variables as return predictors. They include the consensus Forcerank score, the predicted score, the residual
score, and a decile rank based on the stock’s contest-adjusted return over the past one week, one month, and one quarter (Ret(t) score, Ret(t − 3, t) score, and
Ret(t − 11, t) score, respectively). The consensus Forcerank score is the average of the Forcerank consensus rankings of the same stock across contests. The
predicted score is computed as the fitted value from the nonlinear regression in Eq. (2) of the main text using the consensus Forcerank score defined above as the
dependent variable and using contest-adjusted past returns as the explanatory variables. The residual of this regression is labeled as the residual score. Panel
B contains robustness checks; Forcerank-based score variables are horseraced against continuous variables of past returns and dummy variables that represent
extreme past returns in the top or the bottom decile. In addition, stock characteristics such as size and book-to-market ratio are also controlled for. Returns are
in daily percent, and the t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Score variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent variable: Daily return in week t+ 1
Forcerank score –0.0246*** –0.0293***
(–2.75) (–3.22)
Predicted score –0.0321*** –0.0716***
(–4.22) (–4.41)
Residual score –0.0162* –0.0238***
(–1.86) (–2.71)
Ret(t) score 0.0025 –0.0221 0.0245 –0.0255
(0.25) (–1.02) (1.32) (–1.18)
Ret(t− 3, t) score –0.0267** 0.0049 0.0264 –0.0011
(–2.30) (0.24) (1.20) (–0.06)
Ret(t− 11, t) score –0.0051 0.0058 0.0032 0.0084
(–0.40) (0.44) (0.22) (0.64)
Observations 59,929 59,929 59,929 59,929 59,929 59,929 59,929 59,929 59,929
R-squared 0.019 0.013 0.018 0.024 0.027 0.035 0.096 0.094 0.096
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Panel B: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent variable: Daily return in week t+ 1
Forcerank score –0.0285*** –0.0149* –0.0164**
(–3.36) (–1.88) (–2.01)
Predicted score –0.0831*** –0.0358*** –0.0479***
(–5.65) (–2.60) (–4.76)
Residual score –0.0179** –0.0139* –0.0089
(–2.17) (–1.79) (–1.10)
Ret(t) –0.0093 0.0193 –0.0133
(–0.81) (1.55) (–1.20)
Top decile of Ret(t) 0.200** 0.0457 0.204*
(1.99) (0.63) (1.95)
Bottom decile of Ret(t) –0.116 –0.119 –0.111
(–1.29) (–1.32) (–1.25)
Ret(t− 3, t) –0.0023 0.0058 –0.0030
(–0.47) (0.97) (–0.61)
Top decile of Ret(t− 3, t) –0.436*** –0.479*** –0.441***
(–5.58) (–6.26) (–5.57)
Bottom decile of Ret(t− 3, t) –0.0055 –0.0184 –0.0036
(–0.06) (–0.21) (–0.04)
Ret(t− 11, t) 0.0027 0.0036 0.0034
(1.21) (1.47) (1.44)
Top decile of Ret(t− 11, t) –0.427*** –0.323*** –0.445***
(–4.06) (–3.51) (–4.12)
Bottom decile of Ret(t− 11, t) –0.0365 –0.0954 –0.0361
(–0.46) (–1.17) (–0.45)
`n(Size) –0.0643*** –0.0779*** –0.0644*** –0.0909*** –0.0810*** –0.0716*** –0.0679*** –0.0786*** –0.0687***
(–3.19) (–3.64) (–3.29) (–3.79) (–3.59) (–3.38) (–3.34) (–3.66) (–3.49)
`n(B/M) 0.0311 0.0351 0.0194 0.0269 0.0607* 0.0265 0.0302 0.0373 0.0197
(0.82) (0.88) (0.46) (0.76) (1.71) (0.72) (0.79) (0.93) (0.47)
Observations 59,929 59,929 59,929 59,929 59,929 59,929 59,929 59,929 59,929
R-squared 0.138 0.139 0.149 0.135 0.135 0.146 0.137 0.139 0.148
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Table 8
Return predictability: heterogeneity.
This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth forecasting regressions. For each week t and each stock i, the
dependent variable is the daily return of stock i over week t+1. The explanatory variables include the Forcerank score,
the predicted score, and a decile rank based on the stock’s contest-adjusted return over the past one week, one month,
and one quarter (Ret(t) score, Ret(t − 3, t) score, and Ret(t − 11, t) score, respectively). The consensus Forcerank
score is the average of the Forcerank consensus rankings of the same stock across contests. The predicted score is
computed as the fitted value from the nonlinear regression in Eq. (2) of the main text using the consensus Forcerank
score defined above as the dependent variable and using contest-adjusted past returns as the explanatory variables.
In Panel A, the stocks covered on Forcerank are partitioned into two groups based on institutional ownership that
we obtained from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database and measured at the end of December
2015; ownership is set to zero if no institution in the database reports its ownership of the stock. Stocks with low
(high) institutional ownership have a below-median (above-median) fraction of shares owned by institutions. In Panel
B, stocks covered on Forcerank are partitioned into two groups based on the degree of extrapolation—for each stock
i, this is measured by λi,1(1− λi,2). Returns are in daily percent, and the t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Institutional ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Daily return in week t+ 1
Low IO High IO Low IO High IO
Forcerank score –0.0398*** –0.0125
(–3.13) (–1.12)
Predicted score –0.0880*** –0.0062
(–4.28) (–0.30)
Ret(t) score –0.0132 0.0230 0.0408** 0.0146
(–0.86) (1.50) (2.45) (0.77)
Ret(t− 3, t) score –0.0023 –0.0057 0.0052 –0.0455**
(–0.33) (–0.66) (0.27) (–1.99)
Ret(t− 11, t) score –0.0029 0.0018 0.0398** –0.0061
(–0.30) (0.41) (2.14) (–0.34)
Observations 30,014 29,915 30,014 29,915
R-squared 0.148 0.176 0.135 0.171
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Panel B: Degree of extrapolation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Daily return in week t+ 1
Low degree High degree Low degree High degree
Forcerank score –0.0196* –0.235**
(–1.72) (–2.28)
Predicted score –0.0558*** –0.161***
(–3.11) (–4.89)
Ret(t) score 0.0243** –0.0112 0.0655*** 0.0962***
(2.27) (–0.51) (3.95) (3.35)
Ret(t− 3, t) score –0.0424*** –0.0154 –0.0456** 0.0626**
(–6.85) (–1.38) (–2.46) (2.24)
Ret(t− 11, t) score 0.0166*** 0.0359** 0.0221 –0.0603**
(4.59) (2.23) (1.21) (–2.28)
Observations 19,617 18,730 19,617 18,730
R-squared 0.160 0.234 0.150 0.237
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Table 9
Return predictability: trading strategies.
This table shows daily calendar-time portfolio returns. Panel A examines stocks covered by the Forcerank platform.
At the beginning of every calendar week, the stocks are ranked in an ascending order into five quintiles on the
basis of their consensus Forcerank scores, the predicted scores (the fitted values from the nonlinear regression in
Eq. (2) of the main text using contest-adjusted past returns as the explanatory variables), the residual scores (the
difference between the Forcerank scores and the predicted scores), the contest-adjusted return over the past week,
and the contest-adjusted return over the past month. “L” in Column (1) corresponds to the bottom quintile, and
“H” in Column (2) corresponds to the top quintile. The stocks are equally weighted within a given portfolio, and
the portfolio is rebalanced every calendar week. Calendar-time alphas are estimated using raw returns, the CAPM,
the Fama-French five-factor model alone, and the Fama-French five-factor model augmented with the momentum
factor and the short-term reversal factor. Panels B and C examine an out-of-sample period from April 9, 2001 to
December 31, 2017. Panel B includes all stocks; Panel C includes the top size quintile stocks based on the CRSP cap-
based portfolio assignment. Panels B and C sort stocks into ten deciles instead of five quintiles. Also, for these two
panels, the predicted scores are constructed using industry-adjusted returns over the past 12 weeks. The explanatory
variables also include “predicted score PN,” the fitted value from the nonlinear regression in Eq. (3) of the main text:
this fitted value allows for the asymmetry between positive and negative past returns when estimating λ1 and λ2.
Stocks with prices below $5 per share at the beginning of each calendar week are removed from the sample. Returns
are in daily percent, and the t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L H L−H L−H L−H L−H
Raw CAPM FF5 FF5+Mom+Rev
Panel A: In sample
Forcerank score 0.155*** 0.0740* 0.0811** 0.0680* 0.0706** 0.0705**
(3.07) (1.67) (2.33) (1.96) (2.16) (2.14)
Predicted score 0.137*** 0.0666 0.0651** 0.0675** 0.0679** 0.0547*
(2.88) (1.39) (2.01) (2.07) (2.08) (1.70)
Residual score 0.154*** 0.0853* 0.0689** 0.0635* 0.0670** 0.0667**
(3.03) (1.81) (2.07) (1.89) (2.03) (2.01)
Contest-adjusted Ret(t) 0.128*** 0.0803 0.0367 0.0441 0.0429 0.0351
(2.70) (1.54) (1.09) (1.31) (1.28) (1.05)
Contest-adjusted Ret(t− 3, t) 0.117** 0.0806 0.0445 0.0455 0.0462 0.0301
(2.41) (1.56) (1.25) (1.26) (1.30) (0.86)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L H L−H L−H L−H L−H
Raw CAPM FF5 FF5+Mom+Rev
Panel B: Out of sample
Predicted score 0.242*** –0.0025 0.244*** 0.238*** 0.246*** 0.215***
(9.04) (–0.11) (14.29) (14.34) (14.91) (16.59)
Predicted score PN 0.246*** –0.0001 0.246*** 0.238*** 0.255*** 0.231***
(8.95) (–0.00) (13.78) (13.94) (15.38) (16.09)
Industry-adjusted Ret(t) 0.224*** 0.0027 0.221*** 0.216*** 0.223*** 0.198***
(8.44) (0.12) (12.13) (12.07) (12.55) (12.55)
Industry-adjusted Ret(t− 3, t) 0.200*** 0.0285 0.172*** 0.164*** 0.175*** 0.136***
(7.13) (1.29) (9.08) (9.02) (9.73) (11.01)
Panel C: Out-of-sample large cap
Predicted score 0.114*** 0.0106 0.104*** 0.0967*** 0.110*** 0.0671***
(3.29) (0.36) (4.14) (3.92) (4.50) (3.36)
Predicted score PN 0.156*** 0.0185 0.137*** 0.120*** 0.150*** 0.121***
(3.58) (0.85) (4.18) (3.91) (5.12) (4.50)
Industry-adjusted Ret(t) 0.113*** 0.0208 0.0921*** 0.0843*** 0.0984*** 0.0608**
(3.17) (0.70) (3.34) (3.11) (3.68) (2.56)
Industry-adjusted Ret(t− 3, t) 0.0842** 0.0252 0.0590** 0.0489* 0.0633** 0.0069
(2.29) (0.87) (2.04) (1.74) (2.27) (0.34)
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